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Abstract 
The paper starts by describing the political process that is about to elevate the Norwegian 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of the Editor - or the Editors' Code for short - from private 
arrangement to public law.  It argues that  
 
1. Establishing the Editors' Code by law will not enact the principle of editorial 
independence, but manifest the power of media owners 
2. Establishing the principle of editorial independence by law will not solve the problem 
of monopoly control with the freedom of expression, but create new forms of 
monopoly control    
 
Firstly, the Editors' Code has been hailed for being the Magna Carta of the Norwegian media. 
The Magna Carta is the English medieval freedom charter for the nobility. In this paper it is 
argued that the Editors' Code resembles more the Norwegian medieval code of conduct for the 
nobility, the King's Mirror. It endows the editors with responsibility, while the media owners 
retain the power. Secondly, the purpose of enacting the Editors' Code is to prevent owners 
controlling many and influential media outlets from obtaining centralized monopoly control 
over media content. However, by enacting the principle of editorial independence the state will 
have introduced itself as the freedom of expression's court of appeal. Thereby the existing, and 
for the state threatening, relation between the four estates (the legislative, executive, judicial - 
and the media) will be turned upside down. Rather than the media as the fourth estate 
controlling the three real state powers, the legislative state power will have empowered the 
executive and judicial state powers to control the media. 
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Foreword 
 
The manuscript is based on a paper presented at the international workshop "Corporate 
Governance of Media Companies" in Stockholm 1-2 October 2004, sponsored by the 
Media Management and Transformation Centre (MMTC) of Jönköping International 
Business School (JIBS). Selected papers from the workshop, addressing media internal 
governance issues, are presented in JIBS Research Reports No. 2005:1, edited by 
Robert Picard.  
 
This paper addresses a different issue: External government interference into internal 
media governance, by means of elevating a private arrangement of the Norwegian 
newspaper industry, the Editors' Code, to the status of public law. The paper updates 
and expands the argument presented in two earlier essays written in Norwegian, 
"Redaktørplakaten - en alternativ fortolkning" ("The Editors' Code - an Alternative 
Interpretation") and "Lovfesting av redaktørens uavhengighet" ("Enacting the 
Independence of the Editor"), both published in the report "Statsmakt og mediemakt" 
("State Power and Media Power"), Research Report No. 5/2002 from the Norwegian 
School of Management BI.  
 
The paper received financial support from the Norwegian Media Authority 
(Medietilsynet), advised by the Council for Applied Media Research (Rådet for anvendt 
medieforskning, RAM).  
 
Asle Rolland 
Centre for Media Economics  
May 2005 
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Introduction 
 
In 1953 the National Association of Norwegian Newspapers (now: the Norwegian 
Media Businesses' Association) and the Association of Norwegian Editors adopted a 
declaration on the rights and duties of the editors. In Norway it is known as the 
Redaktørplakaten; it will be referred to as the Editors' Code. Since 1995 a proposal to 
promote it into public law has been an issue on the media political agenda. By 2004 it 
seems that the main obstacle towards legislation, the Constitution's present §100 on the 
Freedom of expression, is about to be removed.  
 
The stated purpose and justification of the proposed legislation is that it will prevent 
monopoly control with the freedom of expression. However, in my paper I will argue in 
favor of the following two assertions: 
 
• Establishing the Editors' Code by law will not enact the principle of editorial 
independence, but manifest the power of media owners 
• Establishing the principle of editorial independence by law will not solve the 
problem of monopoly control with the freedom of expression, but create new 
forms of monopoly control    
 
State intervention and legislation is different from the approach recommended by the 
Council of Europe. The Council's Recommendation No R (99), a document otherwise 
hailed by Norwegian media policy authorities (cp. e.g. St. meld. no. 57 for 2000-2001, 
paragraph 3.4.1), was that "Member States should encourage media organizations to 
strengthen editorial and journalistic independence voluntarily through editorial statutes 
or other self-regulatory means" (Council of Europe 1999, Appendix IV). The 
Norwegian approach therefore supports Knut Heidar's proposition that a distinct feature 
of Norway is "the primacy of politics", with a "state/society mix" that is "somewhat 
more 'state-biased' than most other West European countries" (Heidar 2001: 5-7). 
From Private Arrangement to Public Law? 
  
The first attempt to enact the Editors' Code was not surprisingly made by the 
Association of Norwegian Editors. Their proposal attracted the attention of the 
government’s Media Ownership Committee, appointed in 1993 and reporting two years 
later. The mandate of the Ownership Committee was (1) to survey the development of 
ownership change in the Norwegian media, (2) evaluate the consequences of ownership 
concentration and foreign ownership for the freedom of speech, editorial freedom, and 
the preservation of a differentiated media system, (3) to evaluate the need for 
governmental regulations to prevent undesirable consequences of ownership 
concentration and the increasing rate of cross-ownership, and (4) to propose regulative 
measures in order to prevent undesirable manifestations of the concentration tendencies, 
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and safeguard freedom of speech, editorial freedom, and media diversity. This task led 
the committee to the Editors’ Code as a measure to curb the power of media owners and 
thus reduce the potential negative effect of media concentration on freedom of speech. 
In its report the committee wrote that  
 
“Editorial freedom in the media is important for the freedom of  speech. In practice 
editorial freedom will be linked to the independence and autonomy of each editor. 
Safeguarding editorial freedom will thus contribute to counteracting possible negative 
effects of ownership and ownership concentration …   
 
The principle of editorial freedom is basic for free and independent mass media, 
founded on the editor's responsibility for what is being  published as well as protecting 
editors against intervention and oversteering in the discharge of their profession. 
Editorial freedom is expressed in the voluntary agreement between the National 
Association of Norwegian Newspapers and the Norwegian Editors Association – 
Redaktørplakaten”(NOU 1995:3). 
 
The Ownership Committee feared that the status of the Editors’ Code was not 
sufficiently solid as “to withstand pressure from among others public authorities, 
pressure groups, the media owners, the media employees, and pressure due to economy 
and market development”. There was reason to believe that such pressure would 
increase. Therefore editorial freedom should be strengthened by legislation. This would 
prevent the present media owners from terminating or limiting the existing agreement, 
secure that new media owners will not set aside or limit it, and ensure that new media 
are not established without an agreement on editorial freedom as a foundation of their 
business (p. 110). 
 
The facts that the issue at stake was enacting an existing agreement between the parties 
involved, and that the three large media owners were all represented in the unanimous 
Ownership Committee, indicated that the Editors' Code could become law rather 
quickly. However, ten years later the issue is still pending, despite repeated attempts to 
obtain legislation. The first setback came in 1998, when the Ministry of Justice, 
responding to a hearing note from the Ministry of Culture, assessed that enacting the 
principle of editorial independence could be in conflict with the Constitution's §100 on 
the freedom of expression, as it could prevent the media owners from expressing 
themselves in their own publications. The Association of Norwegian Editors tried to 
overrule the Ministry of Justice by asking a reputed firm of lawyers for their opinion, 
but despite a favorable statement from the lawyers, a new Cabinet Minister of Culture in 
1999 told the Parliament that the government would not propose legislation, as it could 
be unconstitutional. Later that year, however, the governmental Commission on 
Freedom of Expression, appointed in 1996 to revise the Constitution's §100, reopened 
the issue and gave it a thorough examination in its report (NOU 1999:27, p. 97-100). 
The Commission was divided on the desirability of legislation, and did not make a clear 
recommendation. Still it did make an impact on the following political debate, as it 
stated that a law on editorial freedom would not be in conflict with the new §100 that it 
proposed. This linked the issue of legislation to an amendment of the Constitution, a 
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lengthier process that in Norway presupposes election of a new Parliament (in this case 
for the period 2005-2009). This became clear when the Parliament in 2002 debated the 
Ministry of Culture's new media report (St. meld. nr. 57 for 2000-2001). All political 
parties except the Progressive Party were in favor of legislation as proposed by the 
Ministry, i.e. provided it was not in conflict with the Constitution. 
 
Then in March 2004 the Ministry of Justice published its report to the Parliament on 
amendment of the Constitution's §100 (St. meld. nr. 26 for 2003-2004). Here the 
Ministry announced its intention to propose a law on editorial independence. According 
to the Ministry, the considerations in favor of legislation carry heavier weight than the 
considerations implying that the legislators should restrain themselves from intervening 
in the media-internal distribution of competence. Furthermore, the Ministry had noticed 
that legislation would not be in conflict with the proposed prohibition of prior 
censorship, provided that the law would respect the kind of reservations implicit in the 
Editors' Code's reference to "fundamental views and aims". As far as possible the law 
must subdue the considerations weighing against legislation. A basic condition will be 
that a law on editorial independence must not interfere with the right of media owners to 
set up superior aims and guidelines for the editing. The Ministry considered this 
necessary for investments in media enterprises to be interesting for other but purely 
commercial motives. Furthermore, the law should not apply to organizations publishing 
members' magazines or the like.  
 
These considerations indicate that the intention of the Ministry of Justice is to establish 
by law the Editors' Code exactly as it already exists as a private agreement. 
 
The Editors' Code as the Magna Carta of the Norwegian Media  
 
The common interpretation of the Editors' Code is that it establishes the principle of 
editorial freedom and independence from the media owners (cp. Eide 2000, Østbye 
2000). The editors consider it their charter, and compare it with the British Magna 
Carta of 1215. After a revision in 1973 it is as follows (www.nj.no/English): 
 
“An editor shall always keep in mind the ideal purpose of the press. The editor shall 
promote the freedom of opinion and in accordance with the best of his/her abilities 
strive for what he/she feels serves society. 
  
Through his/her paper the editor shall promote an impartial and free exchange of 
information and opinion. The editor shall nurture a type of journalism that makes it 
clear to the reader what is reporting and submission of information and facts, and what 
are the opinions and judgements of the newspaper. 
 
An editor is expected to share the fundamental views and aims of his/her publication. 
But within this framework the editor is entitled to a free and independent leadership of 
the editorial department and editorial work and full freedom to shape the opinions of 
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the paper even if the publisher or the board does not share them in single matters. If the 
editor finds himself/herself in irreconcilable conflict with the fundamental views of the 
paper, the editor is obliged to resign. The editor must never allow himself/herself to be 
influenced to advocate opinions that are not in accord with the editor's own conviction.  
 
The editor bears the judicial responsibility for the paper, and has the full and personal 
responsibility for the contents of the newspaper. The editor directs and is responsible 
for the activity of the members of the editorial department and is the link between them 
and the publisher/board. The editor may delegate authority in accord with his/her 
credentials. The newspaper may appoint more than one editor, including an editor for 
advertising contents”. 
 
"The Rights and Duties of the Editor" contains about ten duties and only two or three 
items that with some benevolence may be called rights. For such a document to be 
considered a freedom charter at least one of two conditions must be present. Either the 
rights are much more important than the duties, and/or the duties too are in reality 
rights. The latter must imply that the editors have duties superior to the interests of the 
owners, and that these duties give the editors rights the owners must accept. This 
implies that by signing the agreement the owners acknowledge the right of editors to 
disobey orders that are in conflict with the editor's duties. The purpose of the Editors' 
Code is then to legitimize editorial disobedience to the owners. 
 
However, victory to the editors is merely one of three possible interpretations of the 
Editors' Code. It may also be interpreted as a compromise between the parties, and as a 
victory to the media owners. Interpreted as a compromise the distribution of rights and 
duties may be said to express this. The owners have given the editors some rights in 
return for accepting their duties, and the editors have accepted some duties in return for 
being awarded some much-coveted rights. Interpreted as a victory to the owners, even 
the rights of the editors must be understood as duties.    
  
The Editors' Code as the King's Mirror of the Norwegian Media  
        
In October 2003 the Association of Norwegian Editors celebrated the 50th anniversary 
of the Editors' Code. In its issue preceding the celebration, Dagens Medier, the journal 
of the Norwegian Media Businesses' Association, published an interview with the 
author of this paper. Under his portrait, covering most of the front page, the title was a 
quote put in his mouth: "No reason to celebrate" (Dagens Medier no. 10/03). Inside the 
journal a whole page was devoted to the Editors' Code. Rolland was quoted saying that 
it resembles not the British medieval document Magna Carta but rather the Norwegian 
medieval document the King's Mirror, in which "the admonishing father is tutoring his 
son. In the Editors' Code the media owners are tutoring their editors", he said. Rolland 
maintained that the declaration gives the editors the responsibility while the owners 
retain the power. Thus the owners have power without responsibility, and the editors 
have responsibility without power. Obviously it benefits the owners that their editors 
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think they have won a freedom charter. It improves the editors' work moral without 
altering the real power distribution, he said. 
 
The journal confronted three significant actors with Rolland's opinions, and they all 
responded by shaking their heads in disapproval. The significant actors were: the 
president of the media businesses' association, who also happens to be newspaper 
editor, the deputy general secretary of the editors association, and the media professor 
who on commission wrote an historical narrative of Norwegian editors for the 
associations' 50th anniversary in 2000. However, having finished shaking their heads 
they all declared that they agreed with Rolland, who was said to kick in open doors. In 
the following issue of Dagens Medier Rolland could not resist comparing this with H. 
C. Andersen's fairy tale, where the crowd politely admired the emperor's new clothes 
until a child said he does not have any, after which the crowd said of course not, we 
knew that all the time. Rolland also elaborated the Magna Carta/King's Mirror 
metaphor, and said that if the Editors' Code were to resemble the Magna Carta, it would 
have been the editors instructing the media owners, and not conversely (Rolland 2003a). 
The Two Interpretations Compared 
      
The essay "The Editors' Code, an Alternative Interpretation" (in Rolland 2002b) argues 
that the code must be understood against its historical background. It was made and 
agreed upon in the heydays of the party press, when the media owners were political 
parties or persons sympathizing with them, and when the employed editors also were 
politicians, as the position itself was political, purposively or effectively. The party 
press had great potential for conflict between owners and editors. The owners were in 
business for political rather than economic reasons, and shared the editors' interest for 
media content. Thus they had strong motives for editorial interference and oversteering, 
which obviously must have been a nuisance for the editors. The owners also knew that 
by appointing editors they were making some of their own employees politically very 
powerful, as their editors were in fact full-time non-elected politicians controlling the 
means of daily communication with the voters and party members. Obviously the 
editors too were aware of the power entrusted to them. It was a system where owners 
and editors could have their own, opposing political agendas, in agreement or conflict 
with the party program or the party leadership's agenda, as in all parties there could be 
opposition, conflict, and wings. It was a system where loyalty and trust continuously 
could be challenged. Hence it was a system in need for internal traffic regulation as 
means for its own survival. 
 
The editors took the initiative, but the media owners have lived comfortably with the 
code for more than fifty years. This could imply that in 1953 the owners were put in 
their place in no uncertain terms, or that the media (at first only the newspapers) have 
been favored with unselfish and trustful owners having no scruples depositing their 
fortunes in the hands of independent editors. However, two parties are needed to make 
an agreement, and a good one has advantages for both. The fact that the media owners 
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have been against enacting an agreement they signed long ago indicates that they are 
satisfied with the present arrangement, and fear a loss of control if the state enters it at 
the side of the editors. The fact that the media owners are in control is contrary to the 
interpretation of the code as the media's Magna Carta. 
The ideal Purpose of the Press 
The first paragraph of the Editors' Code identifies a series of editorial duties that all 
must be transformed into rights in order to correspond with the Magna Carta 
interpretation. It starts with the editor's duty always to "keep in mind the ideal purpose 
of the press". The item holds up an ideal standard against which the owners can measure 
the performance of their editors. The ideal is however not controversial in the media 
industry, but set, approved, and guarded by the media's ethical organization, the 
Norwegian Press Association, where the owners' and the editors' associations are both 
members (it also includes broadcast media). The Magna Carta interpretation of the code 
requires disregard of this fact. The item is then not expressing the editors' duties to 
ideals shared with the owners, but duties to ideals superseding the interests of the 
owners, who do not "always keep in mind the ideal purpose of the press". This 
transforms the duty to a right: the right of editors to ignore what they consider 
illegitimate orders from the owners. Consequently it cannot be left for the owners to 
decide whether an editor's performance is in accordance with the ideal standard. Who 
should then be authorized to do this? The Editors' Code leaves this open. The answer 
may be other editors, judgment by peers. However, it can also be the society as a whole, 
which may require delegation of the competence to the state. It may require elevation of 
the Editors' Code to public law. 
 
The King's Mirror interpretation of the code implies it must be the media owners who 
are concerned about "the ideal purpose of the press", and therefore want to ascertain that 
their hired editors share their concern. By delegating the power of editing the owners 
make themselves dependent on the editors, and will naturally look for measures that can 
reduce the risk they take. Furthermore, at the time of the party press there was hardly 
any conflict between the ideal purpose of the press and the ideal purpose of the political 
party, as they were both serving the society as vehicles for obtainment and preservation 
of democratic power. Keeping in mind the ideal purpose of the press could therefore be 
equal to respecting the political objects clause set by the owners. 
 
The item can also be interpreted as a limitation of the editor’s area of responsibility. The 
media may have ideal (political) and commercial objects clauses. According to this 
interpretation the editor’s responsibility is limited to the ideal (political) goals, while 
somebody else is responsible for the commercial goals. “Somebody else” – could that 
be the owners themselves? Then there is the question of goal hierarchy. However, even 
when politics is the goal and economy the means, it will be the means that determine the 
possibilities of realizing the goal. In that sense the economy will always be superior. 
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Promoting the Freedom of Opinion 
Promoting the freedom of opinion, also in the first paragraph, is another obligation 
against which the editor’s performance can be measured. Again the Magna Carta 
interpretation implies that the owners do not respect the ideal, but are forced by the 
editors to accept what for them is sacred. The interpretation turns the duty to a right: 
The right of editors to print opinions disliked by the owners without risking sanctions 
from them. According to the Kings' Mirror interpretation, however, the freedom of 
opinion is important for the owners (too). It is important for their freedom of trade as 
well as their party political activities. Particularly for the party press freedom of opinion 
was fundamental. While a commercial press can exist with limited freedom of opinion - 
although this restricts its freedom of trade - a party press will under such conditions 
cease to exist, or it must go underground. However, for the party press freedom of 
opinion is not merely freedom from public intervention. It is also freedom to decide who 
is allowed to express what to whom. It presupposes freedom of print, but not the duty to 
print. The individual party newspaper is perhaps not the quintessence of freedom of 
opinion, but the party press system may be that. The power of editing trusted to the 
editor is the power to distribute the freedom of opinion, including reserving it for the 
editor him/herself. From this point of view an order from the owners to the editor to 
promote the freedom of opinion serves to limit the power of editing. Editors are not 
permitted to manage the freedom of opinion at their own discretion, and run the risk that 
the owners will consider this abuse of power.  
Serving the Society 
By insisting that the editor "in accordance with the best of his/her abilities [must] strive 
for what he/she feels serves society", also in the first paragraph, the owners once more 
point with exhortation against the editor. And once more the Magna Carta interpretation 
requires that the editor has societal duties that are superior to the owners interests, that 
the owners reluctantly recognize this, and are forced to guarantee the editor safe conduct 
if their interests conflict. The editor is then obliged to take the society's side against the 
owners, and must use their media property to take care of the society's interests against 
them. Hence it can hardly be left for the owners to decide whether the editor fulfils 
his/her societal obligations. 
 
The King's Mirror interpretation is once more that the media owners (too) aim at 
serving the society. A clear indication of that is the fact that they linked their 
newspapers to the political parties. Their intention with this item in the Editors' Code is 
then to ensure that the editors are committed to the same objects clause. Alternatively 
the editor may use the owners' newspapers to promote the editor's own interests, or the 
editor may allow it being used to support third party interests at variance with those of 
the newspaper owners.  
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Facts and Opinions 
The second paragraph of the Editors' Code, concerning the duty to promote an impartial 
and free exchange of information and opinion, and to make it clear to the reader what is 
reporting and submission of information and facts, and what are the opinions and 
judgements of the newspaper, follows the same pattern. That is, in order to coincide 
with the Magna Carta interpretation the duties must be superior to the interests of the 
owners, who acknowledge that the editors have the right to fulfil their superior duties 
even when it is detrimental to the owners. The alternative Kings' Mirror interpretation is 
once more to prevent editors from promoting their own or third party interests. The 
Magna Carta interpretation implies that the owners prefer partial information as well as 
opinions and judgments presented as facts, which may have contained an element of 
truth at the time of the party press. From the Kings' Mirror point of view, however, the 
second paragraph provides the owners with opportunities for control. The owners have 
empowered the editor with the task to express opinions on their behalf. As for other 
readers confusion of opinions and facts makes it difficult for the owners to control what 
the editor really means, and hence whether his/her opinions correspond with their own. 
For the owners it is therefore advantageous that editorial opinions are clearly expressed. 
 
Freedom to shape the Opinions of the Paper 
The third paragraph of the Editors' Code, in particular the item that the editor is entitled 
to a free and independent leadership of the editorial department and editorial work and 
full freedom to shape the opinions of the paper even if the publisher or the board does 
not share them in single matters, is obviously the one most frequently referred to when 
interpreting the Code as the editors' charter and guarantee of editorial independence. 
Thus in his account for the Norwegian governmental study Power and Democracy 
1998-2003 media professor Helge Østbye comments the paragraph as follows:  
 
"Generally industrial owners have full control over the production taking place in their 
enterprises, and its organization. There is no formal lower limit to what details the 
owners may interfere in. Through the Editors' Code the newspaper owners have waived 
the right to control details in newspaper content, i.e. is a voluntary and contracted 
transfer of power from owner to editor. … Behind this lays an understanding of the 
newspapers' special importance as information providers and opinion leaders in the 
society" (Østbye 2000).             
 
However, Østbye is also aware that the freedom item appears in a paragraph that wraps 
it with obligations. Preceding this item is the editor's duty "to share the fundamental 
views and aims of his/her publication". Following it is the obligation to resign "if the 
editor finds himself/herself in irreconcilable conflict with the fundamental views of the 
paper". Following it is also the obligation never "to advocate opinions that are not in 
accord with the editor's own conviction".  The Editors' Code does not question the 
exclusive right of owners to decide what is the publication's aim and scope, or their 
right to operationalize this as detailed as they want to. Neither does the Code prevent 
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them from ensuring that they appoint loyal editors (on the contrary, it is presupposed 
that they do so), nor to appoint an editor from their own ranks if they so wish. 
Delegation of Power 
The Kings' Mirror interpretation is that the third paragraph does not give the editor 
freedom to act independent of and contrary to the interests of the owners. It merely 
expresses the most effective way of securing editorial loyalty to the owners while 
simultaneously maintaining efficiency in the fight against deadlines and competitors to 
be first with the news. There are two ways of preventing unwanted expressions in 
newspapers as well as other media. The Norwegian Governmental Commission on 
Freedom of Expression called them "prior censorship", and "freedom under 
responsibility" (NOU 1999:27, Ch. 7). We may simply call them "censorship" and "self-
censorship". Without self-censorship freedom under responsibility implies post-
censorship and sanctioning of the expressions. The educational effect of holding 
someone responsible is self-censorship. 
 
The editor's main task in a newspaper is not to write, but to edit. What editing is, the 
Commission on Freedom of Expression explained by posing a rhetorical question: 
"What is the difference between editing and prior censorship?" (p. 56).  The editor 
censors the paper's own journalists as well as contributions from outside. Guideline for 
the censorship is the publication's "views and aims". According to the Editors' Code 
there are other considerations too - the ideal purpose of the press, the freedom of 
opinion, the society, impartiality. Neglect of these considerations is probably not 
advantageous for the editor. However, it is only irreconcilable conflict with the "views 
and aims" that has a contracted effect upon the editor's position, and the effect is then 
final, as it obliges the editor to resign. The publication's "views and aims" is therefore 
superior to the other considerations in the Editors' code. The implication is that if a 
conflict emerges between the other considerations and the publications "views and 
aims", the editor must put the other considerations aside or resign. 
 
Appointing the editor normally satisfies the owners' need for prior censorship. As stated 
in the Code the editor is the link between the owners/the board and the editorial 
department. Svennik Høyer has described how this functions. "The editor is the owners' 
spokesman to the journalists and the journalists' spokesman to the board" (Høyer 1975). 
In order to overrule the editor the owners must have delegated authority to additionally 
one or two control instances, for example the board or its chairman. The alternative to 
delegation is summoning a general assembly before each deadline, with debate and vote 
on each item to be published. If one such control instance were empowered with the 
same authority as the editor, this instance would obviously take over the role as editor-
in-chief. The issue would then be who should control the control instance, guard the 
guardian. The result would be a hierarchy of control instances - the editor, the chairman 
of the board, the whole board, the general assembly - and a paralysed bureaucracy. The 
newspaper would lose the fight against its own deadline, and unless all newspapers did 
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the same, the one that introduced prior censorship by the owners would be the sure loser 
in the fight to be first with the news. 
 
Prior censorship by the owners therefore has an obvious downside in the form of 
reduced effectiveness in every sense, and loss of profit due to this. For censorship 
despite this to be profitable to the owners, it must have an upside greater than the loss. 
The upside will probably not be of an economic kind, but must be related to the need to 
prevent unwanted information and opinions from being printed. 
 
In order to assess whether such an upside exists we may return to Østbye's assertion that 
behind the voluntary and contracted transfer of power from owners to editors "lies an 
understanding of the newspapers' special importance as information providers and 
opinion leaders in the society". Østbye suggests that the newspapers are particularly 
important information providers and opinion leaders; hence their management cannot be 
left to amateurs. Fortunately the owners have understood this, and therefore they have 
transferred the power to the editors who have the necessary competence. Østbye 
maintains that such a power transfer is unique for enterprises having signed the Editors' 
Code, but similar arrangements can be found in other fields where the daily operations 
require skills that the owners do not necessarily have.  
 
It is not unusual do demand a certain level of competence, and authorization, before one 
is entrusted the right to express opinions. The assertion that newspapers are particularly 
important information providers and opinion leaders must also imply that they are 
particularly important for the democracy, which in fact is how this is explained in the 
ethical codes of Norwegian media. For the democracy, however, the competence 
requirement is very low, as for most Norwegians reaching the age of 18 is sufficient to 
be authorized as competent to cast a vote. The democratic competence of the media 
owners is acknowledged by the Editors' Code, which presupposes that the owners have 
set up the "views and aims" the editor must comply with.  
Big and small Issues 
However, what is special for the newspapers is not their contribution to the democracy. 
Other institutions too contribute to the democracy, not least the political parties. Special 
for the newspapers (but common to them and other media) is their continuous and 
endless production of micro information, called news, among which some are important 
for the democracy, but most are irrelevant and trivial. Each news item is inextricably 
linked to opinions and judgments, among which the most fundamental is the opinion 
that the news item is worth publishing. Other judgments take the form of comments or 
evaluations. Together with the endless stream of news there is therefore an equally 
endless stream of judgments and opinions, most of which are ephemera just like the 
news. After each football match newspapers pass an opinion on each player, the referee, 
and the audience, for instance. Obviously confidence in the newspaper is greater if this 
opinion is based on professional competence, as this ensures that it is in accord with the 
accepted norms for achievement. Still football is something everyone is entitled to have 
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an opinion on, and the opinion of the newspaper's opinion may be divided. The owners 
too may disagree with the newspaper's opinion, and as the editor obviously has accepted 
its printing, a situation has come into being where the editor has used his or her right "to 
shape the opinions of the paper even if the publisher or the board does not share them in 
single matters". However, although the owners disagree, they may still have confidence 
in the sports journalists and consider them more competent to evaluate the players.  
 
The owners have not yielded power in matters important for the democracy. What is 
important they decide by giving the newspaper "views and aims". "Within this 
framework" it can hardly cost them much to give the editor "full freedom to shape the 
opinions of the paper". It saves them the trouble of having an opinion themselves on all 
kinds of trivialities. It is also at the micro level of detail information that professional 
competence is important for the judgment, and hence for the readers' trust in it. At this 
level being able to lean on journalistic competence is therefore in every sense an 
advantage for the owners.       
   
At the macro level of big issues, however, like the issue of democracy, professional 
competence is not required for expressing opinions and obtaining influence by doing so. 
Every person of age is qualified to decide the nation's health policy, for instance. It is 
only at the micro level, like carrying out surgery on a person, that health decisions 
require professional competence. The bigger issue, the more entitled are all citizens to 
express their opinions. All except the editors. For them applies the opposite rule: The 
smaller issue, the more entitled are they to express their own opinions. The bigger issue, 
the more committed are they by the Editors' Code to express the "views and aims" of the 
media owners.              
Post-Censoring the Editor 
The Editors' Code entitles the editor "to a free and independent leadership of the 
editorial department" - on their own responsibility and at their own risk. The owners do 
not assist with prior censorship that could have exempted the editor from responsibility 
or reduced the risk, relative to the readers, sources, the penal code, or the owners 
themselves. It may also be advantageous for the owners that the editor has "full freedom 
to shape the opinions of the paper". It enables them to avoid responsibility for unpopular 
and controversial opinions, even when they agree with the editor, who is then left in the 
lurch. Neither does the Code allow the editor to distribute responsibility internally, 
because the editor "has the full and personal responsibility for the contents of the 
newspaper". Irrespective of who actually produced the unwanted opinion, the 
responsibility is glued to the editor. 
 
By abstaining from prior censorship the owners show that they trust the editor. They 
trust that the editor will pass reasonable judgments, and expect that the editor's own 
prior censorship, called editing, will cater for the "views and aims" set for the paper. 
However, they do not trust the editor more than to threaten with the consequences if the 
editor proves unworthy of their confidence. "If the editor finds himself/herself in 
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irreconcilable conflict with the fundamental views of the paper, the editor is obliged to 
resign", is the solution the editors have accepted by signing the Editors' Code. 
 
The item presupposes that the right person was appointed, but then something happened 
that was unacceptable to the owners, which the editor will realize and take the 
consequence of by resigning the position as editor (the Code says nothing about leaving 
the paper altogether, nor about the owners' responsibility to find the editor another job). 
A silk cord is handed out. Perhaps for that reason it is not stated how the owners intend 
to find out whether the editor is "in irreconcilable conflict with the fundamental views 
of the paper". This however is something the owners may ascertain by carrying out 
post-censorship of the published paper. For the post-censorship it must be advantageous 
that the editor has: 
 
• Made "it clear to the reader what is reporting and submission of information 
and facts, and what are the opinions and judgements of the newspaper" 
• Never allowed "himself/herself to be influenced to advocate opinions that are 
not in accord with the editor's own conviction" 
 
Particularly the latter duty must help clarifying whether the editor is "in irreconcilable 
conflict with the fundamental views of the paper". Then both parties know what the 
Code demands from the editor. An editor who wants to stay in office despite an 
"irreconcilable conflict" knows also what to do. The editor must break the rule never 
"to advocate opinions that are not in accord with the editor's own conviction". The 
editor must choose self-censorship, a widespread phenomenon in the party press (Dahl 
1999). Then the owners can unchallenged ascertain that the editor did support their 
view on a free and independent basis, as the editor has "full freedom to shape the 
opinions of the paper" and "must never allow himself/herself to be influenced to 
advocate opinions that are not in accord with the editor's own conviction". 
 
This must be the editors' freedom and independence according to the Editors' Code. It 
is freedom to disagree with the owners in matters that are unimportant to them. In 
important matters the editor has free choice between agreeing with the owners and 
resigning office.  
 
The Magna Carta interpretation of the Editors' Code presupposes antagonism between 
owners and editors. If the editor's conviction is the same as the owners, the 
interpretation becomes irrelevant. However, the editor's full freedom to shape the 
opinions of the paper is then full freedom to express the opinions of the owners. At the 
time of the party press appointing editors and journalists who were also party members 
catered for this. The item "an editor is expected to share the fundamental views and 
aims of his/her publication" is also a typical product of the party press. Otherwise it 
would probably suffice referring to the aims, which obviously may be something else 
than a party programme, for instance serving the readers, the society, the market, or 
making a profit. Particularly the latter aim has taken over as "problem" since the party 
press was abolished. Thus the Norwegian Governmental Commission on Freedom of 
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Expression states that "wanting owners who are not interested in media content is in a 
sense to ask for owners who give priority to the profit, which indirectly can have large 
and harmful effect on the content despite the editor's independence, or rather precisely 
because of that independence" (NOU 1999:27, p. 98). 
 
The King's Mirror interpretation seems to confirm that the Editors' Code gives the 
responsibility to the editors and the power to the owners.  No wonder the Norwegian 
Media Businesses' Association considers it a splendid agreement. When the association 
is against it becoming Norwegian law, it must be because they know the intention is to 
wrest power from the owners. In their comment to the proposal the association 
therefore threatens that irrespective of whatever the legislators may decide, no 
responsible editor "can stay in profound conflict with the owners". 
 
When the Association of Norwegian Editors and its members can accept and applaud a 
Code that gives them responsibility without power, it must be because the alternative is 
even worse. The alternative to self-censorship is prior censorship, and as the 
Commission on Freedom of Expression states, "this is a particularly unfortunate form 
of sanction against expressions" (p. 166). To this we may add that probably the owners 
have not so strong opinions that they cannot live with those of the editors - and that the 
editors have not so strong opinions that they cannot live with those of the owners. 
 
Thus elevating the Editors' Code to the level of Norwegian Law should enact right of 
the owners to decide the "views and aims" of the media, and the duty of the editors to 
use the silk cord if they find themselves in "in irreconcilable conflict" with these views 
and aims. The most obvious effect is to save the owners from the trouble and cost of 
providing resigning editors with financial parachutes. Having got rid of the editor 
causing problems the owners are free to appoint themselves as editors if they so wish, 
or to edit all papers belonging to the same group from its central office. This would 
effectively prevent the problem of "irreconcilable conflict" from reappearing. 
Establishing the Principle of Editorial Independence by Law 
 
The proposal to enacting the Editors' Code is not the only outcome of the Media 
Ownership Committee. It also resulted in the Media Ownership Act of 1997 (in force 
from 1999), and a new Media Ownership Authority to supervise it. In addition the 
media are under surveillance from the Competition Authority, whose legal instrument 
is the Competition Act. Double control makes the media the most scrutinized sector of 
trade and industry. Economically the media business is not particularly important. 
Politically however it attracts more attention now than under "the old media order", as 
the newly completed governmental study of power and democracy called it (Slaatta 
2003, Østerud et al 2003, NOU 2003:19), that is at the time when the politically 
relevant media were all under the control of political institutions (the party press, the 
state broadcasting monopoly). We must assume it attracts attention precisely because it 
is no longer under direct political control, while still being highly relevant for political 
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affairs. "The new media order" is challenging the political system from a politically 
autonomous position where it is answerable only to the market.  
 
The ideal purpose of the Media Ownership Act is "to promote freedom of expression, 
genuine opportunities to express one's opinions and a comprehensive range of media". 
The real purpose deducted from this is to prevent media concentration. The main legal 
instrument is intervention to prevent acquisitions resulting in the new owner gaining 
"significant ownership position in the national, regional, or local media market". What 
is a significant position is left for the Ownership Authority to decide. The act states that 
no intervention may be carried out unless the acquirer gains a share of 20 per cent of 
the national newspaper circulation, and the acquisition results in increased ownership 
concentration in the newspaper and broadcasting industries in a local or regional 
market. As guideline for intervention the Authority set the share to 33 per cent. 
 
In 2004 the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs proposed some changes in the act. 
At the national level it opened for more concentration, as the limit for intervention was 
raised to 40 per cent (KKD 2004a and b). This part of the proposal the Media 
Businesses' Association approved (MBA 2004). Locally the proposal was to drop 
intervention altogether, which hardly makes any difference, as most local media 
markets already are monopolized (Rolland 2002a). Controversial were the limits 
proposed for regional ownership (60 per cent) and multimedia concentration (20-30 per 
cent), which were said to "strangle media-Norway" (Dagens Medier no. 3/04). The 
MBA was against both. On the other hand, the association accepted the proposal to 
enacting the principle of the editor's independence, provided it did not weaken or 
undermine the agreement between owners and editors as expressed in the Editors' 
Code. The MBA noted that the whole media business now stands behind this proposal, 
and that all the three big ownership groups all have established arrangements that limit 
the power of the owners. 
Ownership Concentration 
We may ask why all of the media owners, big and small, now are in favor of enacting 
the principle of editorial independence. They know the intention is to prevent 
concentration of power over editorial content. They know also the assumption that this 
power presupposes concentration of ownership, and that the number of media outlets 
with the same owner will not matter if each outlet has an autonomous editor. Each 
editor will then have full control, and the joint owner no control, over editorial content. 
However, from this they can also easily deduct that if law guarantees editorial 
independence, the state has no reason to prevent further concentration of media 
ownership, and can allow their companies to continue growing by acquisitions. In 
accord with transactional power theory (Coleman 1973, Hernes 1975) they are 
therefore willing to make an exchange whereby they reduce their political power in 
return for increased economic power. Particularly if the Editors' Code is the instrument 
used to reduce their political power, then this implies they will have it both ways. The 
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reduction of their political power will be only nominal, but the increase of their 
economic power will be real. 
 
Executive Vice President Jan Erik Knarbakk of Schibsted, Norway's leading private 
media group, argued along these lines in a recent newspaper article with the title "Enact 
the principles of the Editors' Code" (Knarbakk 2004). "We do not need strong 
restrictions on media ownership in order to protect freedom of expression and media 
pluralism", he maintained. "These values are better protected by enacting the principle 
of editorial freedom", which will make "any other regulation of the media business than 
the Competition Act superfluous". The thought that editorial independence makes the 
Media Ownership Act superfluous has struck even the Media Ownership Authority, 
which argues vehemently that the politicians must not let the media owners fool them.  
 
"It is not certain that enacting the principle will have any practical impact. Like today 
the editor must adapt to the views and aims decided by the owners for the media 
enterprise. Like today it will be the board that appoints editors. Like today it will be 
power that rules, and an editor who has lost the confidence of the board or the owners 
will not stay in office for long"(Gramstad 2002), 
 
the Authority's director Sigve Gramstad told the Media Businesses' Association at their 
annual meeting in 2002. Gramstad also had problems seeing what sanctions an act on 
editorial independence could have. His warning was clearly picked up by the Ministry 
of Culture and Church Affairs, as it is repeated in their proposal to amend the 
ownership law (KKD 2004a).  
 
Obviously the Authority is also fighting for its own reason to exist (partly without 
success, as from 2005 it is swallowed by a new Media Authority), and is therefore 
contributing to William Niskanen's Public Choice theory of bureaucracy, that public 
services, like actors in the market, are motivated by self interest (Niskanen 1971). 
However, precisely for that reason the Authority is able to see the Editors' Code as the 
King's Mirror of the media, not the Magna Carta that makes ownership intervention 
superfluous. 
State-guaranteed Autonomy 
We must ask what would happen if legislation actually resulted in the editors becoming 
a state guarantee for autonomy and independence of the media owners. This Magna 
Carta interpretation of the Editors' Code was particularly argued by the former Labour 
government's Ministry of Culture in their media report to the Parliament (St. meld. no. 
57 for 2000-2001). The Ministry gave two arguments in favor of total independence (p. 
101). One was rooted in the freedom of expression: 
 
"A basic element in the concept of freedom of expression is that there shall not occur any 
censorship or pressure on individuals in order to prevent opinions from being expressed".               
 
The other was rooted in the desirability of audience trust in media's credibility: 
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 "The editors are important in our democracy. They shall be guarantors for the freedom 
 of expression, for independence, that the audience can trust what is being published and 
 transmitted by the media". 
         
Editorial independence is an "important condition for media's function as channels for 
information and opinion", the Ministry stated. Its conclusion was therefore that the 
Ministry wished to "fortify the editorial institution". 
 
What the Ministry considered "a basic element in the concept of freedom of 
expression" was obviously that "there shall not occur any censorship or pressure" on 
the editors, from the owners, " in order to prevent opinions from being expressed". 
Apparently the editors have a extraordinary demand for freedom of expression, greater 
than that of other people, and this demand requires protection against the media owners 
who have appointed the editor to carry out a job for them, a work condition the editor 
has agreed to by accepting the appointment. 
 
No doubt editors express themselves in public more often than persons not working in 
the media. As the Commission on Freedom of Expression said, they are guardians for 
the channels to the public sphere (NOU 1999:27). Therefore they are in much better 
position than others to control the public debate. 
 
Due to their more frequent contributions, it is also reasonable to assume that editors 
more often than others find themselves in conflict with actors wishing to prevent or 
sanction their opinions. More often in absolute figures, then relative to the number of 
attempts we must assume that editors more often pass the censorship - their own 
censorship, which they under the name of editing bring upon all those who try to 
compete with them for public attention. 
 
However, the frequency of contributions should not imply that editors have an 
extraordinary right to express themselves. Here quantity and quality seems to be 
confused. The Ministry of Culture did not state it openly, but tacitly it apparently was 
about to introduce graduation in the freedom of expression. This seems a giant leap 
from the Constitution of 1814, which in its §100 gave freedom of print and speech to 
everyone without reservations. However, the leap had a fresh precedence in the 
Commission on Freedom of Expression, which in 1999 proposed that freedom of 
expression should be limited to qualified persons, those having come of age, what 
Norwegians do when turning 18 (NOU 1999:27, p. 22-23). It seemed that a hierarchy 
was emerging, where unqualified persons had no freedom of expression at all, qualified 
persons had it, and editors had it in particular. 
 
Contrary to this the Department also stated that the editors "shall be guarantors for the 
freedom of expression". We must assume it is not their own freedom of expression the 
editors must guarantee, but the freedom of others to express themselves via the mass 
media. If other persons are to have the same rights as the editors, if "a basic element in 
the concept of freedom of expression is that there shall not occur any censorship or 
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pressure" on those who wish to express themselves, there is reason to question the 
autonomy of the editors. Freedom of expression seems then rather to put editors as well 
as owners on the sideline, as they are the only ones in position "to prevent opinions 
from being expressed". The ideal media outlet seems to be a marketplace of opinions 
where the editor functions as mouthpiece for everyone in turn. Enacting editorial 
independence will then prevent the owners from interfering and stopping expressions. 
Independence enables the editor to accomplish the institution's task as lackey for those 
wishing to express themselves. 
 
However, it is well known that editors have problems accepting the role as mouthpiece. 
In fact, in the journalism of "the new media order" nothing is more insulting (Slaatta 
2003, Østerud et al 2003). It is also in the nature of things that the media must be 
edited, at least when there is surplus of opinions relative to the available space and 
time. Here we glimpse another role for the editor in the Department's proposal, the role 
as "channel guardian" or censoring instance, the one deciding who shall be given 
access to whom in the public sphere for what expressions. Then the editor is not only to 
guarantee freedom of expression. The editor must also guarantee "that the audience can 
trust what is being published and transmitted by the media". 
 
Obviously the media's power increases the more we trust in them. With a combination 
of high confidence and low efforts to obtain information from other sources the 
audience becomes the dependent part in a dominance/dependency relationship 
controlled by the media. Hence the media are very concerned about the trust they 
receive from the audience, and conduct frequent studies of confidence and credibility. 
That this is motivated by a desire for power rather than money, at least in Norway, is 
revealed by the fact that the large and quite affluent tabloids are the media constantly 
receiving the lowest scores on the trust barometers. Confidence is apparently not 
necessary for economic success. 
 
The concept of  'trust' may be defined as confidence in the good intentions of the 
media, faith in their willingness and ability to work for the good of the citizens and 
assurance they will not abuse their power (cp. Elliott 1997:41). However, we may also 
ask how wise it is of the audience to place its fortune in the hands of the media. It 
presupposes that the media deserve being trusted, especially if the audience abstains 
from controlling them. There are also aspects of media content that cannot be 
controlled. Particularly important is the impossibility of controlling the truthfulness of 
opinions. They may be liked or disliked, but they cannot be true or false. Involved here 
is the media ethical distinction between facts and evaluations, information and 
comments. The truthfulness of an asserted fact may be controlled, at least in principle. 
Evaluations and comments evade control. 
 
To the editor's evaluations belongs the selection of facts to be published. This 
evaluation too is neither false nor true. The audience's reliance on the media, and the 
media's power over the audience, is of course at its greatest when the audience accepts 
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the editor's selection of facts and opinions. The audience then accepts that the editor 
decides what the audience shall know and mean. 
 
It is not unlikely that editors enjoy seeing themselves in the role as spiritual leaders for 
their audience. Nor is it unlikely that in the audience there are many who need an editor 
as their opinion leader. This need is presupposed by the two-step hypothesis of media 
effects, although the opinion leader originally was conceived to be a trusted person who 
read and guaranteed for the editor's evaluations (Lazarsfeld et al 1948). 
 
It may still be argued that blind faith is not a wise audience strategy (Lund & Rolland 
1987). Even the audience should learn to distinguish between facts and evaluations. 
The audience should pose a quality demand on the media that their facts are credible, 
and if they pass that test over a longer period of time this will build confidence to what 
they present as facts. However, the audience should stay sceptical to the media's 
evaluations, including the evaluation of what facts and comments that should be made 
available to the audience. If the audience builds confidence even in the evaluations, 
they give the media total power over them. 
 
The Ministry of Culture obviously thought that editors know best what facts and 
evaluations the audience should have access to, and hence that the audience should 
trust the editors' selection of facts and evaluations. The audience should have blind 
faith in the editors, contrary to what above was considered a wise audience strategy.  
Concentrated Censorship 
The Ministry of Culture staked the freedom of expression on one card, the editor. 
Thereby power over the freedom of expression would be concentrated to one 
institution. This is the opposite of the Ministry's strategy concerning media ownership. 
That strategy is to prevent power concentration by spreading ownership on as many 
hands as possible. Jens Cavallin (1998) has given this a constitutional basis. Central to 
democratic theory is the principle of power distribution, and this principle must apply 
even for the politically powerful mass media. 
 
Concentrating power over the freedom of expression may in itself put the editorial 
institution under pressure for transformation into an expeditionary office for 
expressions. Such pressure will be difficult to withstand if the editor depends on those 
who want to express themselves, for example as sources, which would be the case for 
politicians, or economically as for advertisers. The conditions are then present for 
exchange of power, where those who have something to offer, in return obtains 
freedom of expression.  
 
As stated already, it is highly unlikely that editors will accept their role being degraded 
to that of the expeditionary office for expressions. In order to ease the pressure the 
editors may then be interested in abrogating their own power monopolies. Albert O. 
Hirschman discussed this phenomenon in the chapter "How monopoly can be 
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comforted by competition" in "Exit, Voice, and Loyalty" (Hirschman 1970). According 
to Hirschman there are many instances where "competition does not restrain monopoly 
as it is supposed to, but comforts and bolsters it by unburdening it of its more 
troublesome customers". In order to get rid of "voice" leading to pressure there must be 
options for "exit". The editor will then refuse unwanted expressions by pointing to 
other media outlets that may want them. To some degree the editors and those who 
want to express themselves therefore have common interests in the existence of 
alternatives. In the Norwegian media system, however, competition is limited to the 
national level and the larger cities. Locally the media monopoly dominates completely 
(Rolland 2002a). Lack of alternatives deprives the editors of an opportunity to get rid 
of "troublesome customers". For the freedom of expression it is of course an even 
greater problem that those who want to express themselves, too, have no alternatives. 
The editor's power is then what Hirschman calls that of the "traditional, full-fledged 
monopoly", where the "customers are securely locked in".  
The Need for a Court of Appeal 
For those who are denied the right to express themselves, freedom of expression 
depends on their ability to surmount the editor's power monopoly. Are there no 
horizontal alternatives, they must look for vertical courts of appeal. They must find and 
convince someone in position to overrule the power of the editor. Above the editors 
stand the media's owners. 
 
In competitive media markets it would make no difference for the freedom of speech 
whether the editor or the owner had the last word in disputes concerning publication. 
The existence of horizontal alternatives would at any rate be more important. The 
absence of competition in Norwegian media markets therefore implies that by enacting 
true editorial autonomy, there will neither be alternatives nor courts of appeal for those 
who wish to express themselves. With monopolized markets and a high degree of 
concentration in the business, enacting the editor's independence will create a media 
system not unlike the medieval fief system. In theory the local lord was the king's 
vassal, but in practice he governed his fief at his own discretion.  
 
The choice seems therefore to be between two evils, either to establish a fief system 
where the editors are local lords over the freedom of expression, or to establish an 
appeals system where power over the freedom of expression is concentrated in steadily 
fewer hands. However, for the freedom of expression it can hardly be doubt as to which 
of these evils is the lesser one. The best solution is to reinstall the active owner, who 
take an interest in media content and is willing and able to interfere if the local editorial 
lords abuse their power. 
 
Firstly, this is the only way to obtain power distribution with monopolized media 
markets. Without horizontal alternatives power must be distributed vertically in an 
appeals system. Incidentally a vertical understanding of this kind now serves to sustain 
the Norwegian state press subsidy system, the original purpose of which was to prevent 
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monopolization by maintaining the existence of the so-called "number two-
newspapers". With virtually all of the horizontal competition having been eliminated 
the press subsidy system is preserved by pointing to the fact that vertical competition 
still exists; hence the press structure in Norway may still be considered competitive (cp 
the report of the latest governmental press subsidy committee, NOU 2000:15). The 
Press Committee refers to Rosse's umbrella model in order to justify this (Rosse 1975, 
Rosse & Dertouzos 1978, Høst in NOU 2000:15), the implication being that divergent 
opinions at different geographical levels are welcomed by the state's press policy.  
 
Secondly, vertical power distribution enables us to exploit the only feature that is 
advantageous to the freedom of expression in a concentrated media system. While 
concentration is a national business phenomenon, most media markets are local, and in 
the national market it hardly matters for the freedom of expression if an actor appears 
only there or is also active locally. The advantage for the local freedom of expression is 
that the national owners are not active themselves in each local market where they are 
present with their media and editors. The owners are then at a greater distance to the 
local events, and unlike the editor they are not part of local networks. It is well known 
that considerations stemming from this lead to a tendency to avoid conflicts in the local 
environment. The Swedish professor of journalism Lars Furhoff called it "the treason 
of the press" (Furhoff 1963). We must assume that this "treason" also cover the way the 
freedom of expression is managed in relation to these conflicts. Perhaps even the local 
editor may benefit from being able to say that the decision to publish was taken at a 
higher level. 
 
The main argument against the active owner is its detrimental effect on the efforts to 
elevate the social prestige of the editorial institution. Besides serving the vanity of the 
editors this also serves the economic interests of the media owners, and therefore they 
may not be willing to accept the role as court of appeal. Interesting are the arguments 
of the trade and industry conglomerate Orkla, one of Norway's three large private 
media owners, in favor of enacting the Editors' Code. This apparently came out as a 
result of an internal study of their newspaper activities. The study concluded with 
economic centralization and ideological decentralization as the most profitable business 
model (Journalisten 2003). Orkla's vision seems to be that the strong and independent 
local editor will serve them just like the news anchorman serves national television 
companies. It builds confidence, attracts viewers and readers. However, the effort to 
elevate the editors' social prestige is similar to and intertwined with the process of 
professionalization, by which the holders of editorial positions obtain a recognized 
monopoly on practicing the craft. In this sense the state's efforts to enact editorial 
independence assists the editors in their struggle for higher social status and 
professionalized monopoly control with the freedom of expression. 
 
The Media Power of the State 
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We may then finally ask: is it likely that the state, the ultimate power in the society, 
will surrender any of that power to anyone who thereby is empowered to threaten the 
state itself? From the Public Choice theoretical point of view the answer is negative. 
From the same perspective we must also assume that it is not sufficient for the state to 
jerk the power to control editing out of the big media owners' hands. The editors must 
be answerable to someone. By enacting the principle of editorial independence that 
someone will be the state itself. 
 
For more than a decade now, the document guiding Norwegian media policy making 
has been the government's report to the Parliament on "Media in our times" (St. meld. 
no. 32 for 1992-1993). During all of that period it has been absolutely clear which 
media actor the state sees as the greatest challenger to its own power. It is the media 
owners, not the editors that represent the threat from the fourth estate. Hence the 
owners are the actors the state must defeat. 
 
It is not difficult to understand why the state fears the media owners. After the 
unwinding of the party press and the de-monopolization of broadcasting there has 
appeared for the first time in Norwegian history significant media owners who neither 
the state nor the political parties control. Under "the old media order" the state 
controlled broadcasting. The state did not control the press, but actors who had or 
legitimately sought state power controlled it. Now there is a "new media order" with 
media owners autonomous to the state and the established political system. They are 
beyond political control. They derive their power from the market, and challenge by 
that the political power, as their audiences and customers are also the citizens of the 
state and the voters of the parties. They represent an unpredictable power (NOU 
2003:19, Østerud et al 2003, Rolland 2003b), and what is unknown causes fear. The 
state does not know what the new media owners want. The state is not even sure who 
the new owners are. It fears that trade and industry may take control over the "media 
carrying opinions". Above all it fears control by foreign owners, who in a sense 
represent a threat to the nation's independence. The Norwegian nation-state is young, 
celebrating its 100th birthday in 2005, and has twice in referendas voted against EU 
membership. 
 
Post-Censorship 
In a democracy, where the Constitution prevents prior censorship, the state must look 
for other means of control. An obvious alternative is the threat of post censorship. 
Enacting the principle of editorial independence seems a suitable instrument for this. 
Empowered by the law the state can control whether the editor has fulfilled his or her 
obligations according to the Editors' Code. Empowered by the law the state can control 
whether the editor has  
 
• Kept in mind what the state considers the ideal purpose of the press  
• Promoted the state's interpretation of the freedom of opinion   
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• Strived with the best of his/her abilities for what the state considers to serve the 
society 
• Promoted what the state considers an impartial and free exchange of 
information and opinion 
• Nurtured a type of journalism that makes it clear to the state what is reporting 
and submission of information and facts, and what are opinions and judgements 
 
The state does not even have to carry out such controls, which may be controversial in 
a democracy. The threat of post censorship may be sufficient to obtain the most 
disciplining and uncontrollable censorship of them all, that of self-censorship. 
 
A presage of this we can find in the state's conditions for obtaining a licence to 
broadcast. Private broadcasters must sign the following agreement with the state 
(quoted from the equal licence conditions for Kanal 4 and P4 for 2004-2014: 
 
• The licencee must carry out its program activities in accordance with the 
principles of freedom of expression and editorial independence. The licencee 
must act completely independent of the owners or other interest groups of 
political, economic or other character 
• As part of the yearly report the licencee shall each year give a public service 
account to the state for its program activities 
     
Adherence to the principles of the Editors' Code is also a condition for obtaining state 
press subsidies. Judged from Trine Syvertsen's recent book on Norwegian media 
pluralism and policy making, the reason why the press has not yet been asked to give 
public service accounts to the state is that it unlike broadcasting does not reach the 
whole population with its messages. Hence the press is a smaller challenge to the state, 
and it is less important to control its activities (Syvertsen 2004:75-79).   
 
The State Controlling the Media 
By enacting the principle of editorial independence the state will have introduced itself 
as the freedom of expression's court of appeal. This is in accordance with the 
Governmental Commission on Freedom of Expression's proposal to amend the 
Constitution's §100 so that it becomes "the responsibility of the State to create 
conditions enabling an open an enlightened public debate" (NOU 1999:27 p. 255), a 
responsibility that the state has been more than willing to accept, cp. the Ministry of 
Justice's parliamentary proposal for amendments of §100 (St. meld. no. 26 for 2003-
2004) approved by the Parliament on September 30, 2004 (Stortinget 2004). It is also 
in accordance with Syvertsen's observation that Norwegian political authorities tend to 
consider the relevant media political instruments for themselves for the fulfilment of 
media policy goals set by the same authorities (Syvertsen 2004:73). By making the 
state the freedom of expression's court of appeal, the existing and for the state 
threatening relation between the estates will be turned upside down. Rather than the 
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media as the fourth estate controlling the three state powers, it will be the second and 
third estates that control the media. This will be perfectly in line with the observation 
made by the Governmental study of Power and Democracy that politics in Norway is 
about to become a legal matter (Østerud 2000, 2001, NOU 2003:19, Østerud et al 
2003). However, it does not confirm that the judicialization replaces politics. It is rather 
the politicians who have found new means to obtain power and control. 
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